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Introduction 
Financial development is key for market integration, rural-
urban specialization, and improved resource allocation. The 
provision of a means of payments and of intermediation between 
savers and investors accelerates growth and improves income 
distribution. In rural economies, however, high transaction 
costs result in low returns to depositors, a high cost of funds 
for investors, and small financial markets. Government 
intervention (inflation, overvalued exchange rates; and interest-
rate ceilings) usually increases these transaction costs as well 
as market fragmentation. 
Financial progress has shown a pronounced urban bias. The 
network of bank branches has been concentrated in the main 
cities, only a few rural agents have had access to formal loans 
and deposit facilities, and specialized rural financial 
institutions have not been viable. Non-uniform transaction costs 
and inadequate regulation explain much of this bias. An 
expansion of the rural branch network increases access to 
financial services, but the funds mobilized may be channelled 
toward urban centers, accentuating the bias. If balanced growth 
is important, this poses a dilemma. 
This paper uses the method of linear graph to measure flows 
of funds between three nodal regions and the corresponding nodes 
within regions in Honduras. Region boundaries are determined by 
the road network and by distance. Nodes are localities with at 
least one full-service bank branch. Dominant nodes (Tegucigalpa, 
San Pedro de Sula, and La Ceiba) are the main centers of economic 
and political power. A simplified balance sheet is used to 
determine the direction of financial flows and the net gradients. 
The paper explores the impact of financial repression on the 
geographical concentration of the flows of funds. 
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Role of Finance in Regional Development 
Specialization and the division of labor are crucial for 
economic growth and rural-urban integration. In developing 
countries growth is accompanied by the specialization along crop 
lines among farmers and by the transfer of functions formally 
carried out by rural households to urban specialist. This 
division of labor facilitates the introduction of equipment, 
changes in organization, and the use of more productive 
technologies, and it thus raises the productivity of labor and 
land (Johnson and Kilby). The division of labor among producers 
cannot go ahead, however, without the expansion of markets to 
integrate their activities. Financial development is key for the 
expansion and integration of all markets. 
The financial sector is unique to the extent to which its 
markets, prices, and policies impinge upon the rest of the 
economy. Money is the only good that trades against every other 
good; interest rates are pervasive relative prices (Shaw). The 
provision of a means of payments is essential for trade and the 
division of labor in commodity and factor markets. 
Intermediation services make specialization between savers and 
investors possible. In the absence of finance, producers are 
either condemned to take advantage of their opportunities only to 
the extent allowed by their endowment of resources or forced to 
invest theirs in poor marginal internal activities. Since those 
who can generate savings are not necessarily those with the best 
investment options, the financial system shifts resources towards 
their most profitable uses, channelling them from units and areas 
of 1 imi ted growth potential to those where rapid expansion is 
possible. This widens portfolio opportunities for wealthholders, 
accelerates growth, and improves income distribution. 
Limited financial progress in developing countries reflects 
resource constraints, lack of education, the isolation of 
economic units, and market fragmentation. If yields on physical 
and human capital are low, savings, investment, and financial 
accumulation are pointless. Most developing countries, however, 
are short of physical and human weal th and long of investment 
opportunities at high rates of return. High transaction costs, 
however, stand in the way of financial-market expansion. 
Economic policies (inflation, interest-rate restrictions, 
overvalued exchange rates, confiscatory reserve requirements, and 
administrative credit allocations) also result in financial 
repression and further increase transaction costs and market 
fragmentation. 
High borrowing 
in rural economies, 
information costly. 
savers are low, funds 
markets are small. 
and lending costs are observed particularly 
where transactions are small, risks high, and 
Due to these transaction costs. returns to 
for investment are expensive, and financial 
Financial progress reduces these costs 
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through exploitation of economies of scale and of scope, the 
accumulation of information, professional management, portfolio 
diversification, and term, size, and risk transformations. 
Specialization among intermediaries increases the variety of 
financial assets available to wealthholders and improves the 
quality of services supplied. 
Finance and the Urban Bias of Development 
Many have expressed concern about the urban bias of economic 
development. Observed disparities between rural and urban growth 
and welfare are inefficient and inequitable. They persist only 
because a small proportion of investment has gone to agriculture. 
The proportion of skilled people who support development 
--doctors, bankers, engineers-- going to the rural areas has 
been low er st i 11. Governments have accentuated the rural-urban 
disparities through the allocation of public expenditure and 
taxation, the deterioration of the terms-of-trade of 
agriculture, and the encouragement of rural savings to flow to 
industrial investment, because the value of manufacturing output 
has been artificially boosted (Lipton). 
The urban bias of financial progress in developing countries 
has paralleled the concentration of economic activity in urban 
nodes. Non-uniform transaction costs, much higher in rural than 
in urban areas due to the lack of infrastructure and to the small 
size, heterogeneity, and geographical dispersion of rural firms, 
explain much of this bias. Financial policies have accentuated 
it. Interest-rate restrictions have made it more difficult for 
intermediaries to service rural clients (Gonzalez-Vega). 
Regulation, prejudices against informal lenders, and restrictions 
to entry in formal markets have also contributed. Exchange-rate 
policies have favored foreign financial centers, while economic 
crises have further augmented these biases. 
The network of bank branches has been concentrated in the 
urban areas. Only a small proportion of the rural population has 
had access to formal credit, from institutions prepared to 
provide loans but not other forms of financial services; fewer 
have had access to deposit facilities. Funds disbursed have come 
from governments, central banks, and international donors. 
Limited intermediation between local savers and investors has 
resulted in discrepancies among marginal rates of return on rural 
investments, while incomplete institutions have lacked financial 
viability and have offered a poor service (Adams and Graham). 
In a few developing countries, governments have promoted 
rural banks or the expansion of the network of rural branches of 
national intermediaries. This has introduced a new dilemma. 
Although the branch network does increase access to financial 
services for the rural population, it is feared that the savings 
so mobilized will be channelled towards urban investment, further 
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decapitalizing the countryside. On the one hand, however, 
intermediation improves allocation and facilitates participation 
in the fruits of growth for non-residents. On the other hand, it 
may accentuate regional disparities if spatial opportunities are 
not evenly distributed. Given perfect markets and efficiency and 
equity objectives only, therefore, rural financial deepening is 
desirable. Imperfections, externalities, and distortions as well 
as non-economic objectives, such as balanced regional growth or 
pole development, may still raise the question of the optimal 
regional pattern of financial progress. 
The Honduran Financial System 
Honduras is the second poorest country in the Western 
Hemisphere, with a per capita income of U.S. $ 700 a year. It is 
pr imar i 1 y agrarian, with over two-thirds of the 1 ab or force in 
the rural areas and one-third of the GDP generated in 
agriculture. Agricultural exports account for 80 percent of the 
foreign exchange earned. Only 4 percent of farms are large, 29 
percent are small, and 67 percent are minifundia. The vast 
majority produce basic grains. Rural families are characterized 
by low per capita incomes (U.S. $ 100 a year), little education, 
and poor living conditions. They often live in isolated mountain 
valleys or regions with difficult access to sources of modern 
health, financial, and agricultural services. They rarely 
succeed in getting formal loans (less than 10 percent of farmers 
receive credit).· While very few have savings accounts, they 
generally attempt to save a little for special future needs. 
The financial system of Honduras is dominated by 16 private 
commercial banks and 3 public development banks. With the 
exception of savings and loan associations, there are few other 
financial institutions. During the 1960s and 1970s the country 
experienced significant financial deepening, reflected in the 
creation of numerous institutions and the growth of credit 
volumes. This progress was made possible by exchange-rate 
stability and the absence of inflation. The ratio of M2 to the 
GDP grew from 13 percent in 1960 to 35 percent in 1978. At the 
same time, the ratio of domestic credit to the GDP increased from 
12 percent in 1960 to 44 percent in 1978. Honduras thus enjoyed 
the fastest process of financial deepening in Central America. 
After 1978, however, in real terms the system suffered a severe 
contraction. The ratio of M2 to the GDP fell to 29 percent in 
1982. In addition, by 1981 the real value of the flow of new 
loans from the banking system had declined to 67 percent of its 
1978 value, while the flow of agricultural loans had declined to 
47 percent of its 1977 value. The number of borrowers declined 
too, as marginal clients, primarily rural, were denied access to 
loans. The proportion of credit devoted to agriculture declined 
with financial repression; the proportion received by small 
farmers shrank even more, according to the iron law of interest-
rate restrictions (Gonzalez-Vega). 
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Market Concentration 
Between 1970 and 1983 the Honduran financial system 
experience a continued deconcentration trend reflected by the 
declining shares of the larger institutions in the allocation of 
credit, the mobilization of deposits from the public, and the 
expansion of the branch banking network. Market deconcentration 
was particularly important for savings and time deposits, where 
competition took the form of both higher interest rates and 
implicit rewards to bank customers. This intense competition 
contributed to an increased mobilization of deposits until 1978. 
Since then, greater financial repression and higher inflation 
rates made it impossible for implicit payments to sufficiently 
compensate the negative real deposit rates. 
Deposit markets had been highly concentrated in the early 
1970s. Afterwards, the smaller institutions became more active 
in their efforts to obtain larger market shares. This was 
achieved by the more rapid expansion of the bank networks of the 
smaller banks in the urban areas. Thus, competition in the 
market for deposits contributed to the urban bias of financial 
progress. Deposit-mobilization windows proliferated in the 
cities and, by 1984, the first automatic teller machines were 
introduced in Tegucigalpa by one of the small banks. 
Variations in the degree of concentration of financial 
markets can be assessed by the use of indices such as the 
Herfindahl index, which is computed as the sum of the squared 
percentage market shares of the participating institutions. A 
value greater than 1800 for this index reflects a highly 
concentrated market; values between 1200 and 1800 are said to 
reflect moderately concentrated markets; and values under 1200 
are indicative of unconcentrated markets. 
Herfindahl indices were computed for selected components of 
the balance sheet of financial institutions. As observed in 
Table 1, all indices reflected a sustained trend towards market 
deconcentration. The index for the total assets of the banking 
system declined from 1422 in 1970 to 790 in 1979, the period of a 
more active deconcentration. A more pronounced process of 
deconcentration was observed with respect to loans and 
investments. The process of deconcentration was even more 
significant with respect to liabilities, which presented a higher 
degree of concentration than the assets of the banking system. 
In effect, the Herfindahl index for demand deposits declined from 
2368 in 1970, when the market was highly concentrated, to 977 in 
1977, a level which characterizes unconcentrated markets. In 
addition, the Herfindahl index for savings and time deposits 
declined from 2618 in 1970 to 729 in 1983. This reflected a 
shift in the preferences of depositors from non-interest bearing 
to interest-bearing accounts, as a result of increasing inflation 
6 
and more intense competition in this market, particularly through 
higher interest rates and more conveniently located offices. In 
spite of the increased competition in the market for deposits, 
restrictions on interest rates and other regulations limited the 
efforts of the intermediaries in increasing the volume of 
deposits mobilized once inflation accelerated after 1978 and 
their value shrunk. 
Expansion of the Banking Network 
During the 1960s and most of the 1970s, the Honduran 
financial system expanded both in terms of the number of 
institutions and of bank branches. By 1970, eleven private 
commercial banks and three public development banks competed in 
the market for deposits. However, only five of the private 
commercial banks had been es ta bl i shed prior to 1960. Five new 
commercial banks were created between 1970 and 1985, but a large 
bank failed in 1981 and forced the Central Bank to bail out its 
depositors in order to maintain public confidence in the system. 
One addition.al public institution was also created during the 
same period, while the number of savings and loan associations 
increased from one to seven. 
In the case of commercial banks and the agricultural 
development bank (BANADESA), the branch network increased from 
134 off ices in 1971 to 244 in 1983. Most of the new branches 
(110) were opened by private commercial banks, while only 7 were 
established by BANADESA. The number of offices of savings and 
loan associations also increased significantly, from 1 to 36. As 
a result, the average number of branches per commercial bank 
increased from 8.5 in 1970 to 14.5 in 1983, and from 1 to 5.1 for 
savings and loan associations. 
Despite of the significant deconcentration in the market for 
deposits and loans, the urban bias of the expansion of the 
Honduran banking system is well reflected by the increase in the 
number of branches that operate in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro de 
Sula, from 57 percent of the total in 1971, to 62 percent by 
1983. These variations in the degree of concentration of the 
branch network can also be assessed by the use of Herfindahl 
indices, as shown in Table 2. The Herfindahl index of 
concentration of bank branches in Honduras increased from 1862 in 
1971 to 2097 in 1983. This result indicates that the 
geographical distribution of the banking system has not only been 
highly concentrated, but that the degree of concentration has 
also increased through time. 
Banks operate both full-service and limited-service branches 
in Honduras. The latter mobilize deposits but do not grant 
loans. Therefore, these branches reduce transaction costs to 
savers but not t-0 borrowers and they accentuate the flow of funds 
towards the cities. Full-service branches accounted for 37 
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percent of all bank offices in 1971. The relative importance of 
this type of branch declined steadily, to 26 percent of the total 
by 1983. The expansion of the branch network emphasized, 
therefore, the mobilization of deposits rather than the provision 
of credit. Herfindahl indices of concentration were also 
computed by type of branch. In the case of full-service 
branches, this index slightly increased, as shown in Table 2. 
The high index for limited-service branches indicates acute 
concentration. In both cases, the moderate rate of change of the 
indices is explained by the fact that during the period the 
relative importance of limited-service branches increased 
steadily. The proliferation of deposit-taking branches reflected 
increased competition in the market for deposits, particularly in 
Tegucigalpa and San Pedro de Sula, the major urban centers. This 
indicates that transaction costs for both depositors and 
intermediaries are lower in the urban than in the rural areas. 
Methodology for the Definition of Regions 
There are three approaches in defining regions. First, the 
concept of a homogeneous region relies on its unifying features, 
but f a i 1 s t o cons i de r i n t r a -- reg i on a 1 i n t er a c t i on s . Se con d , t he 
concept of a nodal region takes into account these interactions 
and treats spatial dimensions as important criteria for the 
definition of regions. Each region has one or more major nodes, 
allowing for the identification of patterns of dominance, while 
the cohesiveness within the region results from internal flows, 
contacts, and interdependencies. Third, the concept of planning 
region responds to the desire of applying a particular set of 
policy instruments or programs to specific areas (Richardson). 
For the analysis of flows of funds, the nodal-region 
approach is the most appropriate. In this paper, the economic 
boundaries of physical regions were established on the basis of 
the road network and the distance between each region's nodes and 
the dominant one. Nodes were defined as localities where at 
least one full-service bank branch operates. A dominant node is 
the center where political power is concentrated. On the basis 
of these criteria three regions can be clearly delineated in 
Honduras: the Southeast, where the dominant node is Tegucigalpa; 
the Northwest, where San Pedro de Sula is dominant; and the 
Northeast, where La Ceiba is dominant. 
Measurement of the Flows of Funds 
The analysis of the flows of funds within the commercial 
banks is performed in two ways. First, a simplified balance 
sheet is used to identify the direction of the flows. It is 
assumed that the volume of credit outstanding in each region is 
backed by deposits mobilized in that region and by funds from 
foreign lenders, the Central Bank, and the bank's equity capital. 
Thus, it becomes possible to identify surplus and deficit 
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regions. Funds from surplus regions and from exogenous sources 
satisfy the excess demand for credit of deficit regions. The 
second approach compares the relative volumes of credit 
outstanding and deposits mobilized across regions, without 
considering exogenous sources of funds. It was further assumed 
that all funds are allocated regionally in the same proportion as 
the observed total demand for credit. This allows for the 
estimation of gradients for the flows of funds between each 
region's nodes and between regions. A net gradient is the 
difference between the proportion of total loans and of total 
deposits at each node. 
Table 3 presents the proportions of loans outstanding, 
deposits mobilized, and allocations of exogenous funds for the 17 
nodes used to characterize the Honduran economy. Over 91 percent 
of deposits were mobilized in the dominant nodes of the three 
regions, which absorbed 93 percent of the loans and over 97 
percent of the exogenous funds. This reflected the lack of 
penetration of the financial system in the rural areas and the 
fragmentation of the Honduran economy. During the period under 
analysis, two of the peripheral nodes in each one of the regions 
behaved as net suppliers of funds, i.e. their outstanding 
deposits were larger than their outstanding portfolio of loans. 
This reflected the decapitalization of the countryside in favor 
of the urban centers. 
Because of the high concentration of banking operations in 
the dominant nodes, the behavior of each node within a particular 
region closely followed that of the dominant node. During the 
1978-83 period a significant increase of the total proportion of 
credit granted was observed in Tegucigalpa. The relative share 
of credit for this node increased from 47 percent in 1979 to 55 
percent by mid-1982. In contrast, the relative participation of 
the San Pedro de Sula node declined from 41 percent by mid-1979 
to 35 percent by mid-1981, and only recovered partially by 1983. 
This significant changes, which partly reflect the severe 
contraction of the total volume of credit granted as a result of 
the crisis, mostly serve as evidence of the abandonment of 
agricultural and other activities outside the urban centers, such 
as industry in the Northwest region, perceived to be riskier by 
the commercial banks. 
When exogenous funds are ignored and gradients for the flows 
of funds are estimated for the period, a net gradient is 
established not only from the corresponding peripheral nodes to 
the dominant node in each region, but also from the Southeast 
region to the Northwest and the Northeast regions. This may 
reflect the existence of more profitable opportunities in these 
areas, which is consistent with their more rapid development in 
recent years. The direction and relative magnitude of the 
gradients are presented in Figure 1, using the method of linear 
graph (Fei). 
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If the urban concentration of deposits and loans and the 
observed pattern of .the flows of funds reflect the existence of 
more profitable investment opportunities in Tegucigalpa, San 
Pedro de Sula, and La Ceiba, as a result of lower risks and wider 
portfolio options, the financial system is contributing to a 
better allocation of resources. More privately attractive 
opportunities in urban areas, however, may not adequately reflect 
social costs and benefits. This may be the case in Honduras, 
given protectionist policies. Tariff protection of 
manufacturing, an overvalued exchange rate, export taxes, price 
controls on foodstuffs, and imports of cheap food have 
artificially reduced the profitability of rural investment. The 
financial concentration observed reflects the impact of these 
distortions on relative profitability. Credit flows, however, 
cannot offset low incomes or low returns to investment in 
agriculture, even at preferential interest rates. Cheap credit 
cannot make an unprofitable investment profitable. Rather, 
borrowers will attempt to avoid the privately unprofitable use of 
resources and, given the fungibility of funds, will channel the 
additional liquidity provided by the loans toward more attractive 
uses (Von Pischke and Adams). 
Given relative prices and incentives in the Honduran 
economy, rural savers receive low returns from agricultural 
investments. Improved opportunities for depositing savings in 
financial institutions will increase their incomes, by allowing 
them to participate in the fruits of investment elsewhere, even 
if this accentuates regional disparities. Present policies 
repress rural incomes; the absence of deposit facilities further 
reduces them. If existing distortions are not corrected, the 
financial system may at least supply valuable services to the 
rural population and reward it with some returns from urban 
investments. The optimum approach will be to attack the 
distortions at their source, through better prices, equilibrium 
exchange rates, additional public investment, and technological 
progress in the rural areas. When this happens, the financial 
system will then contribute to a better allocation of resources, 
both from a private and social perspective. 
The urban concentration of the flows of funds may also 
reflect non-uniform transaction costs. These costs are, in 
general, higher in the rural than in the urban areas, while those 
associated with loans are higher than those associated with 
deposits. Moreover, competition for funds among Honduran 
commercial banks, under interest-rate restrictions, has taken 
place through the creation of numerous and more conveniently 
located branches. On the other hand, underequilibrium interest 
rates on loans have generated excess demands for credit that have 
necessitated nonprice rationing mechanisms for the market to 
clear. Non-interest borrowing costs, particularly in the case of 
marginal rural clients, have been among the preferred mechanisms 
' 
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for rationing, further concentrating loan portfolios (Gonzalez-
Vega) . 
Interest-rate restrictions and other forms of regulation 
have increased transaction costs and market fragmentation, thus 
accentuating the urban concentration of financial flows. As 
financial repression has augmented, during the recent crisis, 
concentration has increased, as predjcted by the iron law of 
interest-rate restrictions (Gonzalez-Vega}. The proportion of 
loans granted in Tegucigalpa increased from 48 percent in 1978 to 
53 percent in 1982, while the proportion granted in the three 
dominant nodes combined increased from 92 to 94 percent. The 
proportion of deposits mobilized in Tegucigalpa increased from 53 
percent in 1978 to 56 percent in 1982, while in the case of the 
three nodes augmented from 93 to 98 percent. 
In summary, non-uniform transaction costs explains the 
substantial urban bias of financial development in Honduras. 
This bias has been accentuated by incorrect financial and non-
financial policies. Interest-rate restrictions and other banking 
regulations have augmented the differentials among transaction 
costs and increased market fragmentation. Price, exchange-rate, 
and fiscal policies have repressed the profitability of rural 
investment, further contributing to the flow of funds from the 
countryside to the cities. 
Table 1: 
Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
Source: 
Honduras: Herfindahl Indices 
Selected Components of the 
Banking System, 1970-1983. 
of Concentration 
Balance Sheets of 
Total Loans and Demand Savings and 
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for 
the 
Assets Investments Deposits' Time Deposits 
1422 1723 2368 2618 
1360 1460 1691 2166 
1241 1399 1439 1921 
1220 1333 1411 1817 
1133 1296 1456 1844 
1128 1249 1380 1720 
920 1039 1066 1490 
805 900 977 1284 
797 907 1070 1082 
790 797 1086 954 
824 859 1106 905 
798 752 920 854 
805 736 969 749 
787 676 889 729 
Computed by the authors from Banco Central de Honduras, 
Boletin Estadistico, several years. 
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Table 2: Honduras: Herfindahl Indices of Concentration for the 
Number of Branches of Commercial Banks and BANADESA, by 
Institution, and by Locality by Type of Branch, 1971-
1983. 
Year 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
Source: 
Institution Locality 
Total Full-service Limited-service 
1635 1862 1536 2154 
1645 1867 1488 2155 
1621 1833 1442 2083 
1482 1887 1461 2124 
1490 1885 1447 2106 
1424 1914 1507 2122 
1361 2011 1575 2221 
1337 2053 1575 2265 
1273 2081 1607 2318 
1194 2093 1638 2276 
1271 2097 1657 2271 
1248 2097 1657 2271 
1248 2097 1657 2271 
Computed by the authors from unpublished records of the 
Banco Central de Honduras. 
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Table 3: Honduras: Average Proportions of Deposits. Credit, and 
Exogenous Funds by Locality, 1978-82 (percentages). 
Node Deposits Credit Other Gradient 
Sources 
Tegucigal12a 54.5 51.3 45.2 -3.2 
Comayagua 0.3 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 
Juticalpa 1.0 0.6 --0. 1 -0.4 
Danli 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.0 
Choluteca 1. 3 1.0 0.4 -0.3 
San Pedro de Sula 33.8 37.6 44.8 3.8 
Puerto Cortes 0.9 0.5 -0.4 -0.4 
El Progreso 0.3 0.2 0.1 -0.1 
Yoro 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 
Santa Rosa 2.4 2.3 2.1 -0.1 
Santa Barbara 0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 
Siguatepeque 0.3 0.2 0.3 -0.1 
La Esperanza 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.1 
La Ceiba 3.1 4.5 7.4 1.4 
Tela 0.5 0.1 -0.6 -0.4 
Trujillo 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 
Olanchito 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 
Source: Computed by the authors from unpublished records of the 
Banco Central de Honduras. 
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Figure 1. Honduras: Net Gradients of Flows of Funds between 
Regions and between Localities, 1978-82. 
Puerto Cortes 
San Pedro 
0. 1 
Santa 
Barbara 
Santa Rosa 
de Co an 
I.a Es eranza 
0.4 o.o 
Tela Tru'illo 
Olanchito 
0.9 
Choluteca 
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